A Clinical View of Affect Theory in Psycho-Analysis

In the clinical practice of psycho-analysis, we use a number of points of reference with regard to the emotions or affects. A considerable degree of consensus exists among psycho-analysts as to certain considerations relevant to their nature and function. A careful study of these areas of consensus is warranted with a view to determining whether some critical additions to our theory can be made on the basis of these clinical considerations. It is particularly warranted, since the prior attempts to construct a useful affect theory have been made with the primary goal of integrating it into our previously established metapsychollogical framework. This has required us to force affect theory into an already established mould with some violence, on occasion, to our practical needs. If the problem is approached primarily from the standpoint of the implications of our clinical position, it offers certain fresh insights into the relationship between affect theory and other phases of our theory.

In view of their nonspecificity, the terms affect and emotion are best used synonymously in psycho-analysis to designate a complex set of physiological, psychological, and motor manifestations. The term feeling is best used to delimit the subjectively experienced aspects of an affect. The feelings are thus the experiences which appear in awareness or consciousness. In clinical practice we always have to do with complex affective and feeling states. We are given to referring to this complex field of action as a 'mood' and to refer loosely to a specific segment of a lesser degree of complexity as an 'affect'. In doing so, we often disregard the fact that what we commonly call 'affects' are themselves mixed states of considerable complexity. This derives from our orientation, in psycho-analysis, towards disturbing affective states which may be contributing to our patients' neurosis. By and large, we exert a selective inattention at any given time towards those aspects of the