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Every two years the Congress of the International addresses itself to a topical subject most likely to advance or clarify the most perplexing clinical-theoretical area of that historical moment.
The theme of the present Congress encompasses the total professional life of the psychoanalyst, the principles which guide him, the goals he strives for, the methods he uses. The scope of the topic says something about the place of psychoanalysis on the intellectual scene today. Confronted from the outer world by a perplexity, if not cynicism, and from within psychoanalysis by an activity and tension which some would call dynamic ferment, and others divisiveness and fragmentation, a need is felt for renewal of purpose. Attention and scrutiny is directed not to the periphery but to the roots. In historical retrospect this type of dilemma is repetitive. Only the contents change.
Theory and clinic are tied together, but with which bonds of understanding and mutual influence? Where does Freud's metapsychology stand today? Does an openness to, if not a connexion with, the natural sciences render this theory invalid, or insensitive to human needs, as some claim, or is such an open face a scientific boon, leaving a potential hope for the future? Is there an equally complete 'clinical theory', more applicable to the psychological sciences? Are the two compatible and complementary, or even one? Within the general clinical theory of therapy, how does the supposedly more abstract metapsychology guide or affect the technical procedure? Within metapsychological theory there are different outlooks toward the various 'points of view'. The economic is the least in favour. Even the structural is being opposed. Can psychoanalysis do without it? How then is conflict explained? Or is conflict also dispensable? What is the theory of neurosogenesis today? Has deficit replaced intrapsychic conflict? Or have both always been parts of an explanatory whole? Is explanation only descr