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Sir,
I would like to make a few brief comments, clarifications and corrections vis-à-vis some statements contained in J. Roiphe's paper ‘The conceptualisation and communication of clinical facts’ (International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 76: 1179-1190).
On page 1179 of her paper the author writes: ‘It is interesting and informative (as Steiner, 1994, elaborates) that Tuckett invokes the discourse of science, while using as his central metaphor for the volume the language of religion’. If I understand correctly, reference is being made here to Tuckett's image of the Babel of ideas within contemporary psychoanalysis, and to the Tower of Babel (see Tuckett, ‘Foreword’, International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 75, p. 865). She also refers to my paper in the same issue, entitled, ‘The Tower of Babel, or “After Babel in contemporary psychoanalysis”’, (Steiner, 1994a, pp. 883-901).
The author seems to imply that I have elaborated on Tuckett's ‘Foreword’, and in particular, his metaphors. As a point of information I should perhaps mention that I was asked to give the title of my paper to the Editor of the International Journal of Psycho-Analysis a few months before the delivery of my paper at West Point in April 1994. I read Tuckett's ‘Foreword’ only after its publication in the Journal. I did not discuss his ‘Foreword’ with him, and only very briefly mentioned the content of my paper once during an informal conversation with him, just to give him some idea of what I intended to say. Indeed, due to various pressures I was unable to complete my paper in time for it to be circulated in advance. The Editor allowed me to present it at West Point after reading it during the flight to New York. I did not, therefore, elaborate on his ‘Foreword’.
Sometimes, in order to achieve accurate conclusions, it is a good idea to try using cumulative evidence. This can be done by employing empirical methods that eschew first sight evidence. This goes as much for reading and interpreting, includi