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(Final version accepted 10 May 2012)
Despite its lengthy history in psychoanalysis, the psychological origins, essential features and value of the oceanic state remain open to dispute. This ambiguity has come at a cost to the clarity of theoretical discussions on the topic. In working towards a conceptual elucidation, the author maintains that there are three primary accounts of the oceanic state: the metaphysical one of Romain Rolland, the developmental one of Sigmund Freud, and the cognitive-perceptual one of Anton Ehrenzweig. Based on the notion of modal contact, he argues that the accounts share a general theoretical structure that establishes as the necessary criterion for all oceanic states the loosening of ego boundaries and sufficient contact between differentiated and undifferentiated modalities of the mind. However, within this common structure, the accounts employ dissimilar metapsychologies to promulgate oceanic states of appreciably distinct kinds. To support this view, the author carries out a comparative examination of the modal contacts involved in the primary accounts' oceanic states. To conclude, he reviews the main implications of the notion of modal contact vis-à-vis recent discussion on oceanic phenomena, and puts forward for consideration a pluralist account of the mind that can accommodate the existence of several kinds of oceanic states.