A Lacanian Perspective on Identity

For most of the twentieth century the concept of identity has not been a concern for psychoanalysts, and there was an excellent reason for this. Freud’s conceptualisation of the unconscious and its dynamics had introduced a radical change in the way of thinking about the human subject, which had become deep, subtle and complex. In the words of Heinz Kohut, “identity is not a depth-psychological concept; it relates primarily to an individual’s conscious and preconscious experiences of his role and personality” (Laplanche and Kohut 1970, 177). The concept of identity cannot explain the emotional investments or the choices and the actions of an individual and fails to explain who, in truth, they are. The Freudian unconscious is a depth-psychological concept. It implies the existence of “active ideas” (Freud 1912) fuelled by the energy of the drives, of which the individual has no awareness. These unconscious ideas “are organised into fantasies or imaginary scenarios to which the instinct becomes fixated, and which may be conceived of as a true mise-en-scène of desire” (Laplanche and Pontalis 1973, 475). Some of the characteristics of the unconscious’ functioning include an absence of negation, of doubt, of degrees of certitude, an indifference to reality, and a subordination to the pleasure principle (Freud 1915). In other words, Freud tells us that human beings are largely unaware of what they really want and truly desire, and that to enjoy the objects they seek, an unconscious part of them is prepared to ignore reality, deny logic and expect satisfaction against all odds and at all costs. Thus, the speaking being utters at best half-truths, that the listener should take with caution. While in the twenty-first century this will sound disturbing to some, in a not too distant past, almost everybody knew this. Multiple examples can be found, even in popular culture. In the 1989 romantic comedy When Harry Met Sally, there is a running joke involving one of Sally’s friends