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Freud (1910) first brings countertransference to our attention as unconscious feelings arising out of the patient’s influence. Viewing it as an obstacle to the analytic process, he insists on recognizing and overcoming it through continuing and deepening self-analysis. After Heimann (1950) suggests that it is an instrument of research into the patient’s unconscious, countertransference starts to be viewed in a positive light. Especially with Bion extending the concept of projective identification, countertransference then solidifies its function in receiving the communication of unbearable emotional contents from patients. Contemporary relational theorists understand it as a joint creation by analyst and patient with varied contributions from each (Gabbard 1995). After evolving for the past century, countertransference is now widely accepted as “an unavoidable and indispensable tool in service of furthering the analytic process” (115).
With each transformation, we seem to have moved further away from Freud’s cautionary advice not to neglect the investigation of our own psyche first for the source of disturbances. Based on my own observation, there is an abundance of psychoanalytic writings discussing the use of countertransference to understand patients, but fewer on the analyst’s self-analysis. However, there exists the inherent challenge to differentiate between the patient’s projections and the analyst’s “internal reaction” (Money-Kyrle 1956).
Perhaps the analyst looking inward should not take a back seat in the exploration of countertransference. Racker (1957) states that internal appraisal “may be the greatest danger and at the same time an important tool for understanding” (303). Gabbard (1995) suggests that, for the projective identification to “stick”, there needs to be a “hook” in the recipient/analyst, which points to the necessity of analysts exploring their own intrapsychic conflicts and defences. Wilson (2013) argues that it is our ethical responsibility