The existence of different currents in psychoanalysis is undeniably positive from the standpoint of a democratic view of scientific practice. However, besides exposing it to severe external and internal criticism, such pluralism imposes difficulties to define its epistemological status. Motivated by this kind of problem, this paper analyses the meaning of Ferenczi's utraquism and some of its implications to psychoanalysis epistemology. Contrary to disjunctions between one and another of the aspects involved in an investigation - e. g., biological or cultural, naturalism or humanism -, the utraquist approach is based on own understanding of Freud's work by Ferenczi. For him, by combining in a single methodology approaches considered irreconcilable, such as the natural sciences and the human or cultural sciences, Freudian metapsychology would have produced a revolution in scientific methods. If Ferenczi's opinion is correct, then how to understand the reasons of disjunctive readings and the proliferation of psychoanalytic currents, from the radically cultural or hermeneutics to avowedly scientific natural? This paper argues that the consideration of Ferenczi's utraquists ideas helps us not only to understand in a new way the epistemological status of the psychoanalytic enterprise initiated by Freud, but rather requires us to rethink our own idea of science.