This paper explores Bateson's epistemology of cybernetics as presented in the series of his conferences and presentations from the mid-1960s until the 70s. After extracting several paradigmatic assertions of Bateson's structuralist position, we compare and analyze these arguments from psychoanalytic, philosophical, and scientific perspectives. The paper argues that assessment of Bateson's cybernetics reveals its structural roots in Saussure, Peirce, and early Lacan. Though, in light of our materialist prejudices, we do take issue with Bateson's nonspatial conception of information. Fundamentally, the epistemology that Gregory Bateson's elaborates in Steps to an Ecology of Mind is a theory of communication. In general, one might summarize the underlying axioms as follows. No event or object is an island in several complementary manners; 1) communication is continuous, ubiquitous and irresistible, 2) each quanta of information only takes on meaning through its context, its difference from other elements, 3) when the system is appropriately delimited, its functioning appears deterministic or at least highly predictive, 4) the system resembles a fractal in that its structure possesses evolving symmetry. We propose to consider this theory of communication in the light of clinical evidence.