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The author questions Wallerstein's (2011) conviction that psychoanalytic concepts are “scientific metaphors”. If one were to adopt his view, psychoanalysis would fall into line with Lakoff and Johnson′s (1980) thesis that the conceptual system of our thought and actions are basically metaphorically structured. The author rejects both their views by demonstrating how thy system inherent in our conceptual structure works and disproving Lakoff and Johnson's thesis as an assertion. In his view, if psychoanalytic concepts are understood as metaphors without defining their target domains, they lose their cognitive function and allow general metaphors to be understood in a whole variety of ways. The author suspects that this metaphorization of psychoanalytic concepts serves to suggest that psychoanalysis has a unified theory which would guarantee the community′s scien-tific unity, despite the theoretical and therapeutic pluralism that currently prevails.