Through a phenomenological approach, that of Merleau-Ponty, this article explores one of the paradoxes of Winnicott's work : the found-created object. Let us commence by justifying resorting to this philosophy followed by our description of how Merleau-Ponty reflects on the relationship to the thing, through the interplay of polysensoriality, of a perceptual sediment and of the world. Merleau-Ponty states that there exists no perception except through a work of reciprocal adjustment between the feeler and the felt. This relationship of adjustment is made by the world and in order to be in the world. This adjustment relationship functions through the implicit presence in everyone of a kind of perceptual sediment. The thing is therefore always a meeting of the internal world and the external world. Thus every perception is transitional. Along the way, we will have the opportunity to encounter certain contributions from cognitive science (Bayesian approach). These reflections will provide a criticism of the contributions by Rochat or Stern concerning the early development of the infant. They both criticize Winnicott's description of early development. However, their presentations may lack the paradox required to maintain a sufficiently complex view of the beginning of life.