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Dissociative splitting, as a psychoanalytic term, remains poorly understood. It can be used as a state or as a dynamic defense. In the trauma literature, dissociation often describes a state of split off self-representations formed under trauma. Modern relational theory proposes a hybrid model of split self-representations but mediated by underlying vulnerabilities and resilience. Following Freud, I understand dissociation as a widespread defense designed to detach from panic anxiety resulting from fears of being intruded upon or overwhelmed or to use Winnicott's term, impinged upon. Freud was moving toward this formulation in his late concepts of denial and disavowal. Ideas about dissociation can be found in the theories of Winnicott, Goldberg, and Leikert. I propose that we can clinically differentiate repression from dissociation. Dissociation is much more widely present than has been acknowledged by classical theory. Moreover, in dissociation, we can find a number of secondary defenses to counter the profound deadness. I offer a clinical example of chronic dissociation. Technique is discussed briefly.