The plays Oedipus Rex and Oedipus at Colonus present two competing perspectives on free-will and moral responsibility. The first perspective, referred to as the Controlling View, posits that individuals sometimes possess the freedom to act differently from how they actually do, thereby making them morally responsible for their actions. The second perspective, called the Knowledgeable View, asserts that individuals lack such freedom and, consequently, are not morally responsible for their actions. This paper proposes that these views correspond to two psychical positions that fulfil different psychological drives. The Controlling Position is suggested to unconsciously satisfy the sadistic drive for control and the demands of the superego, potentially manifesting in castration anxiety and Oedipal guilt. Analysing this unconscious satisfaction may facilitate a transformation towards the Knowledgeable Position, which satisfies the epistemophilic drive. This analysis might reveal some of our unconscious motivations behind the philosophically contentious belief in free-will.