Freud was suspicious of academic philosophy. On his account, philosophy can't help but produce worldviews [Weltanschauungen]: intellectual constructions solving all the problems of our existence uniformly based on one overriding hypothesis. The philosophical position of neuropsychoanalysis is dual-aspect monism, which states that the mind and the brain comprise subjective and objective viewpoints, respectively, onto one and the same part of reality. Despite Freud's critique, dual-aspect monism has been presented as a worldview. The question is whether this is necessary, or whether philosophy without worldview is possible. John Dall'Aglio has argued recently for an update to the philosophy of neuropsychoanalysis in terms of a shift from Spinoza and Kant to Hegel. Over the past 200 years, Hegel has often been cast as the ultimate worldview philosopher, but interpretations from recent decades have resulted in exactly the opposite. Hegel's work is a philosophy of “contradiction” and “drive”, a philosophy inclusive of its own failure to be a worldview which, as this paper aims to show, aligns with the neuropsychoanalysis of Mark Solms at key junctures.