Recent developments in neuropsychoanalysis have challenged the opposition between neuroscientific reductionism and psychoanalytic anti-naturalism. While affective neuroscience increasingly confirms Freud's intuition that feeling constitutes the foundation of mental life (Solms, 2021, 2025), phenomena such as human desire, symptom formation, and subjectivity remain insufficiently explained by affect alone. Drawing on Freud, Lacan, Solms, Bion, Damasio, and others, this paper argues that human subjectivity emerges through an ongoing process of translation between affective and symbolic registers. Affect becomes meaning, meaning becomes desire, desire becomes symptom, and symptoms in turn reshape affect. This circular process cannot be reduced to either neurobiology or language. Building upon earlier work, I introduce the notion of a metaneuropsychology of translation. Its object is neither the brain nor language in isolation, but the unstable traffic between them. The central problem is not the relation between mind and brain, but the relation between feeling and meaning. In a reformulation of Lacan's dictum that “there is no sexual relationship,” one might propose that there is no (complete) cerebral relation either. Human beings are constituted by and transformed through translation and perpetually exceed it. This perspective offers a framework for integrating affective neuroscience, predictive processing, psychoanalytic theory, and clinical practice.