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Paradigms provide scientists not only with a map but also with some of the directions essential for map-making. In learning a paradigm the scientist acquires theory, methods and standards together, usually in an inextricable mixture.… That is [a] reason why schools guided by different paradigms are always slightly at cross-purposes.
Though at intervals down the years one student of the problem after another has been struck that a principal source of anxiety and distress is separation from loved figures, or the threat of separation, there has been great reluctance to accept that simple formula. Objections to it are extremely deep-seated and based on one or more of several common assumptions each of which, it is argued here, is tenable no longer.
In this and the following chapters the simple view is once again advanced. And because there has been so much incredulity and therefore reasoned opposition to it, it is presented in some detail. We begin by considering some of the common assumptions that underlie the traditional incredulity and opposition, with special reference to the influence of Freud's early formulated theory of motivation.
In all psychoanalytic and psychiatric discussion of anxiety it is taken for granted that the emotional states referred to respectively as ‘anxiety’ and ‘fear’ are closely related. In just what way they are related is the puzzle. Freud is concerned repeatedly both to compare and to contrast the two: see, for example, Addendum B to Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (SE 20: 164-168). Others have followed in his steps. Reviewing the whole confused scene in a recent article, Lewis (1967) emphasizes that, throughout the broad field of psychopathology, the word ‘anxiety’ is used habitually to refer to ‘an emotional state with