The Concept of Psychic Structure: Its Metapsychological and Clinical Psychoanalytic Meanings

I am in essential agreement with those who regard the concept of psychological structure as central to modern psychoanalytic thought (Hartmann, 1939) ; (Rapaport, 1960) ; (Guttman, 1973). In this paper, however, I shall attempt to demonstrate that the principal significance of this concept becomes apparent only when its metapsychological and clinical meanings are distinguished and articulated.

Psychoanalytic metapsychology has in recent years become the subject of lively controversy within Freudian circles. In this context the work of Home (1966), Gill (1976) and G. Klein (1976) has been immensely helpful in clarifying the distinction between the metapsychology and the clinical theory of psychoanalysis. According to these authors, the metapsychology and clinical theory derive from two totally different universes of discourse. Metapsychology deals with the material substrate of subjective experience and is thus couched in the natural science framework of impersonal structures, forces and energies which are presumed to actually 'exist' as entities or events in the realm of objective reality. Clinical theory, in contrast, deals with intentionality and the personal meaning of subjective experiences (for example, as disguised wishfulfilments, self-punishments or defensive manoeuvres), seen from the perspective of the individual's unique life history. Metapsychology is concerned with 'how' questions and seeks answers in terms of the 'non-experiential realm' (Sandler & Joffe, 1969) of impersonal mechanisms and causes. Clinical psychoanalysis asks 'why' questions and seeks answers in terms of personal reasons, purposes and individual meanings. Home, Gill and Klein maintain that the natural science framework of metapsychology is completely inappropriate for the elucidation of the data of the psychoanalytic situation, to which the clinical theory is uniquely applicable. Metapsychological and clinical concepts