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Adolf Grunbaum, a philosopher, has written The Foundations of Psychoanalysis, which has attracted attention by analysts and non-analysts. The book is a slashing attack on hermeneutic approaches to psychoanalysis, and clinical approaches in terms of their having any scientific worth. Grunbaum believes data acquired within the analytic situation as 'irretrievably contaminated' by suggestion, incorrect assumptions about the nature of evidence, and bad logic. Clinical evidence is supposed to have only heuristic value; the various hypotheses can only be tested by non -psychoanalytic methods. This paper contests all this on the basis of Grunbaum's own lack of understanding of the nature of psychoanalysis, and his tendentious methods of scholarship, which implacably attack anything psychoanalytic, and, contrarily, accept without criticism various dubious 'researches' by non-psychoanalysts. However, the purpose is not primarily on Grunbaum's work. The aim is to challenge psychoanalytic writers who accept his arguments wholly or in part. Using the book as a test case, the essay examines the enormous differences of opinion among philosophers (and historians) of science among themselves, and in regard to psychoanalysis. It poses actual philosophical problems, as opposed to pseudo-problems, psychoanalysis needs to face.