Metaphor, Neologism and 'Open Texture': Implications for Translating Freud's Scientific Thought

Freud used ordinary-language metaphors to express many of his technical concepts, and the Standard Edition has substituted neologisms for some of the most central ones. This substitution was intended to clarify the theory, but is said to have given a false impression of it by making it appear more 'scientific' and mechanical than it does in the original. The motives for this substitution, and the underlying assumptions about the nature of theory-language and about the relation between empirical observation and the definition of terms, are examined; this is done with special reference to 'ostensive definition' and the 'open texture' of scientific concepts, and in the light of the 'new paradigm' in the philosophy of science which argues that models, analogies and metaphors are typical media of understanding in 'real', as opposed to stereotypic, science. However, such analogies etc. need to be logically controlled in a way that Freud's often are not, and this prevents his vernacular metaphors from becoming as 'scientifically serviceable' as he wished. The argument that Freud's flexibility of language reflected an intentional flexibility of thought is countered, and the argument for non-translation of key terms is considered.