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The purpose of this paper is to take a critical look at object relations theory in the light of our knowledge of cognitive and developmental processes. There is no doubt in my mind that this recent theoretical trend in psychoanalytic theory has been stimulating and beneficial, bringing a human perspective to formerly mechanistic hypotheses. At the same time, object relations theory has introduced a number of concepts and postulated a number of processes which warrant a reevaluation. I believe that to regularly expose a theory to reappraisal is a healthy thing to do. Too often theoretical concepts, which were meant merely as hypothetical constructs, become accepted as real and proven entities. Every theory requires hypothetical constructs; however, these should be seen as convenient fictions which, while rounding out a theoretical position, should not be given such status that they then dictate clinical observation. We should be ready to discard such inferences when they produce logical contradictions, when they are in opposition to other valid findings, or when the same phenomena can be interpreted equally well without recourse to such concepts. In short, theory may be a useful servant but it is a bad master.
Let me begin with a functional analysis of inner objects which are at the core of object relations theory. This is not an easy matter since different authors utilize the concept of the inner object in their own manner and it is difficult to clearly define what is uniformly meant by this construct. Fortunately, Helm