Editorial

Since its inception, psychoanalysis has concerned itself with the phenomenon of affect. This issue of the Journal contains a group of papers which examine the theoretical, developmental and clinical aspects of the subject. There is an enormous amount of information in the psychoanalytic literature on affect; nevertheless, a cohesive theory of affect has yet to evolve and we continue to wrestle with the definition of the term itself. Some view affect as an internal subjective experience with corresponding physiological processes, while others contend that the physiological and motor phenomena are merely a response to subjectively experienced feelings. The words “feeling,” “mood,” and “emotion” are used interchangeably with “affect,” although some authors insist on distinguishing between them. In any event, there seems to be general agreement that an affect is a behavioral event, subjectively experienced, often observed by others, and usually accompanied by physiological changes.

Affects are manifested and most probably experienced prior to language development. During the first few months of life they are assumed to be undifferentiated except for gradations of pleasure and unpleasure. Differentiation of affects seems to occur somewhere between the fifth and eighth month, when the infant becomes aware of mother's presence or absence — hence the terms “separation” and “stranger” anxiety. The subsequent differentiation of affects depends on a number of factors, including parental transmission of affect, the integration of language and cognition with affect, ego and superego development, defense formation, and character structure. Kestenbaum's paper explores the vicissitudes of affect development, while Schecter's article examines the early stages in the differentiation of a specific affect, namely, anxiety.

Failure to integrate and differentiate affects has a profound impact on adult functioning. Krystal contends that those individuals who do not have the capacity to diff