A Critique of Grünbaum on Psychoanalysis

The aim of this paper is to present a critique of Adolf Grübaum's views on psychoanalysis. The paper will highlight Grübaum's criticisms of the epistemic value of clinical results for the validation of psychoanalytic theory. The bulk of these arguments occur in his papers between 1977 and 1982. Of late his criticisms of psychoanalysis have taken a slightly different tack, focusing on the hermeneutic interpretations of psychoanalysis, notably of Jürgen Habermas and Paul Ricoeur (Grünbaum, 1983). However, this paper will not attempt to defend these particular writers, because, in essence, Grünbaum believes that his epistemic critique of psychoanalytic theory, based on the outcome results of its therapeutic encounters, is decisive and is not impinged by these interpretations of psychoanalysis. Thus this paper will concern itself with earlier writings, where Grünbaum's original critique is presented. Also incorporated into Grünbaum's critique of psychoanalysis is a defense of inductivist criteria for demarcation of science from non-science against Popperian criticisms. This controversy, too, will be avoided; my intention is to concentrate on Grünbaum's approach in formulating and carrying out his critique of psychoanalytic theory and therapy. It is pertinent to mention, however, that Grünbaum does not claim, in contrast to Popper, that psychoanalysis is nonscientific or pseudoscientific (Grünbaum, 1979). The thrust of his criticism is to maintain that psychoanalytic theory is largely unsubstantiated by the available clinical and experimental data. His position with regard to clinical data seems to be that it is suspect and too liable to contamination by suggestion from the analyst (Grünbaum, 1980c). In this context, he quotes Judd Marmor (1962), who says,