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Human emotions,* an ubiquitous element of human experience, are a core concept of psychoanalysis, psychiatry, and psychology. Notwithstanding their importance, there is no generally accepted theory concerning their nature at this time. Izard (1969), a noted scholar in the field, stated: “The area of emotional experience and behavior is one of the most confused and ill-defined in psychology.” Plutchik (1980), in the preface to a volume on theories of emotion, affirms that “despite the widespread concern with the topic of emotion, there is at present a feeling of disjointedness about the area” (p. xiii).
In 1983 the American Academy of Psychoanalysis sponsored the publication of a collection of papers under the title Affect—Psychoanalytic Theory and Practice (Cantor and Glucksman, 1983). No comprehensive theory of affects emerged from this collection. In fact, in the survey article, Drellich (1983) confirmed: “We do not possess a satisfactory or unitary theory of affects in psychoanalysis.”
Analysts, starting with Freud and including leading theoreticians such as Brierley (1937), Glover (1939), Jacobson (1953), Rapaport (1953), Rangell (1967), and Kernberg (1982) repeatedly, but thus far unsuccessfully, attempted to find the proper place for the concept of emotions in the theoretical structure of psychoanalysis. The American