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This scholarly written book is a collection of 16 papers presented at the International Conference of Psychoanalysis and the Philosophy of Mind at the University of St. Andrews, England, in March 1985. The bulk of presentations deal with Adolf Grünbaum's The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique; even the more independent last part on dream theories refers back to his work. Thus, the reader's understanding of Grünbaum's central concept is crucial and may be enhanced by the excellent chapter on his epistemology by Barbara von Eckardt in Beyond Freud (1985).
Grünbaum refutes the hermeneutic conceptions of the outstanding European philosophers Jürgen Habermas and Paul Ricoeur and claims that psychoanalysis is a scientific and causal theory. He asserts that Freud's theory is empirically testable and rejects Popper's claim that psychoanalysis is immune to falsification. Concerning Freud's method of clinical investigation, Grünbaum develops a central postulate, which he dubs the “tally argument,” based on Freud's assumption in 1917 that ideas given patients tally with what is really in the patients' mind. Grünbaum calls Freud's assumption a “necessary condition thesis” (NCT). According to Grünbaum, the NCT is untenable in view of spontaneous remissions, suggestive influence of the analyst, and other successful treatment modalities.
Jim Hopkins disagrees with Grünbaum and asserts that commonsense psychological practice has already established causal connections, especially in dreams that show the pattern: motive wish satisfaction.
Frank Cioffi criticizes not only Grünbaum and his “tally argument” but also and more sharply Freud by stating: “The Tally argument was not killed by Freud's discovery of spontaneous remission between 1923 and 1926. It was stillborn” (p. 85). Cioffi calls Freud a “good falsificationist” who was goaded into lying.
In the next chapter, “Psychoanalysis and the Personal,” Morris Eagle claims that the distinction between owning and disown