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Serious questions have been raised as to the applicability of psychoanalytic principles in the treatment of economically deprived individuals (Goldberg and Kane, 1974; Ruiz, 1981; Minuchin, Montalvo, Guerney, Rosman, and Schumer, 1967). Implicit, and at times explicit, assumptions have been made about the level of psychological sophistication of these individuals. It has been assumed for instance that, since they are constantly pulled by the exigencies and tension of their basic needs, their lives can only be defined in concrete and unpsychological terms. Their personality structure can only be characterized by a strong present-time orientation, relatively little ability to defer gratification, and a strong preference toward action, externalization, and somatization rather than observation, awareness, and introspection (Lewis, 1964, 1966). Presumably, the resulting marginal ego and superego functions render these individuals incapable of withstanding the intensity of scrutiny and frustration that are characteristic of the psychoanalytic process (Javier, 1990b). The inherent cultural characteristics (e.g., the view of time, space, and relationships, etc.) that these individuals are likely to bring into their treatment are also viewed as an impediment to the analytic process rather than as a challenge that may call for adjustments in the analytic techniques (Javier, 1990a, 1990b).
Such a view has not been conducive to an objective evaluation of the individual's capacity to benefit from psychoanalytic intervention. We will argue that a treatment intervention that does not allow for a careful exploration of the motivational (conscious and unconscious) forces affecting the individual's condition is de facto