Psychoanalysis and the Philosophy of Science: Collected Papers of Benjamin B. Rubinstein, M.D.: Edited and annotated by Robert R. Holt, Ph.D.,  International Universities Press, Madison, CT, 1997,  715 pp.

Who will read this book, which is attractively produced by the International Universities Press and written by an author with a brilliant and incisive mind? To be able to appreciate it, the average psychoanalyst reader will have to meet the following prerequisites:

1. An acquaintance with many aspects of philosophy, such as the work of Kant, which has bearing on the ontological and epistemological aspects of psychoanalytic theory (e.g., see Chessick, 1987).

2. A thorough background in Freud's metapsychology and an understanding of his epistemological assumptions (e.g., see Chessick, 1981).

3. An understanding of the current unresolved controversy in psychoanalysis regarding the orientation of psychoanalysis as a natural science or as a hermeneutic discipline (see, e.g., Ricouer, 1970).

4. A background in the philosophy of science, often a sterile discipline far removed from what scientists actually do, with the exception of such outstanding authors as Kuhn (1970) and the work of Hempel (1965, 1966) on the philosophy of science, which is brought up by Rubinstein in quite a number of places.

5. Familiarity with the old argument between “simple-minded” positivist philosophers such as Grünbaum (1993) and “muddle-headed” phenomenologist and hermeneutic philosophers who have also studied psychiatry, such as the philosopher-psychiatrist Jaspers (1972).

6. An acquaintance with so-called “ordinary language philosophy” involving such authors as Strawson (see Jones and Fogelin, 1980) and the very important writings of the late Wittgenstein (1962).

7. A background in the unresolved debate still raging today among the best minds available over the so-called mind-brain problem and the problem of consciousness. This includes numerous issues of the Journal of Consciousness Studies as well as books by many important authors in the field, all of whom disagree with each other and some of whom are cited by Rubinstein. [See, e.g., Popper and Eccles (1977), Churchland (1984), Dennett (1978, 1991), Searle (1984), N