The Analyst's Relation to the Good

Recently, much has been written regarding the subjectivity of the analyst and the ways in which the meanings by which the analyst structures experience influences every aspect of understanding and technique. While this idea has become widely accepted, less has been said regarding the ethical and moral aspects of subjectivity, what the philosopher Charles Taylor (1989) calls our “moral frameworks.” Psychoanalysts experience the therapeutic interaction in terms of personal systems of belief, by which they make strong valuations regarding themselves, their patients, the therapeutic relationship, and the treatment process. I believe that the moral and ethical beliefs of the analyst—and in more general terms the analyst's moral framework—are the core of analytic subjectivity. Specifically, I will argue that it is the analyst's sense of where he stands relative to what he considers to be good, or ideal, that is the most important factor in countertransferential reactions.

The good is the framework of ideal, preferential, and highly valued moral concerns, feelings, beliefs, and principles by which we structure and orient our self-experience in the world. At the core of our moral framework are types of beliefs and organizations of meanings that are essentially incomparable, singular, and profoundly important to us (Taylor, 1989). In addition to this preeminent idea of the good, there is a complex of shifting networks of beliefs of relatively less importance, but which nonetheless guide us in our everyday experience relative to the good. Our daily lives involve a continual process of struggle with these various, often conflicting notions of what is good, right, preferable, or desirable.

Some have suggested that I not use the term “moral framework.” They argue that the terminology is off-putting as it connotes images of authoritarianism or religiosity. (Heinz Hartmann also noted this response in his 1960 monograph Psychoanalysis and Moral Values.) Nevertheless, I have decided t