You do not currently have permission to view the full text for this document. Please sign in to an account with an active subscription or contact support.
Disordered affect regulation has recently been proposed as an important etiological factor not only for the so-called classical psychosomatic diseases, as in the well-known psychoanalytic constructs of alexithymia (Sifneos, 1973; Taylor, 1987), pensée opératoire (Marty and de M'Uzan, 1963), and disaffectation (McDougall, 1989), but also for a broad spectrum of psychiatric disorders including substance use disorders, post-traumatic stress disorders, borderline personality disorder, and the major psychotic disorders (Ciompi, 1998; Krystal, 1988; Schore, 1996; Taylor et al., 1997; Westen, 1998). For at least some lines of psychoanalytic thought, affects have substantially replaced the drives as the primary motivators of human behavior (Emde, 1988; Jones, 1995; Lichtenberg, 1989; Stern, 1985). Somewhat similarly, affects are now proposed to be the constituents of drives (Kernberg, 1976) or to include them (Grot-stein, 1997), so that the latter lose their exclusively biological, immutable features. Though rooted in biology, affects include a cognitive/experiential component as well as physiological and behavioral/expressive components (Taylor et al., 1997)
All theories centered on affect development and affect regulation emphasize the importance of interactions with primary caregivers (Garber and Dodge, 1991; Schore, 1994). As Stern (1984, 1985) and Emde (1988) have demonstrated, emotions and their expression are fundamental elements in reciprocal attunement; circularly, interactions with caregivers play a primary role in structuring the experience and expression