Introduction

Psychoanalysis, the science of mind, that grew out of the discoveries of Sigmund Freud, is now a field of rival theories. This trend, which Robert Michels has termed the “theoretical pluralism in psychoanalytic dialogue,” shows no sign of abating. We now belong to a discipline consisting of classical analysts, object relational analysts, relational analysts, interpersonal analysts, self psychologists, Kleinian

analysts, and Lacanian analysts, to name the proponents of only the most important theories.

This trend toward theoretical pluralism, a fact of our professional lives, is both good and bad. In one sense theoretical ferment as witnessed by lively dialogue at our meetings and in the pages of our journals, is constructive. The vitality of any science is measured by the vigor with which key issues are debated. For a science to be in a stage of growth and development it must meet two conditions: There must be clear-cut diverging points of view and there must be passionate proponents of each of the respective positions. Innumerable examples from the history of science demonstrate the relationship between sharp controversy and scientific advance. Is light understandable in terms of particles or waves? Does an ether exist? Does phlogiston exist? Did the universe get started in a big bang or is it a steady state? In these and many other instances, human knowledge has advanced out of the dialectical clash of competing theories. In each instance one can specify the points at issue and the proponents of rival viewpoints.

But there can be a downside to theoretical pluralism. I refer to the organizational developments that so often accompany the growth of competing theories. Groups tend to form around a new theory and take as their raison d'être its promotion and continued development. Hand in hand with the productive exchanges promoted by emerging theories comes a push toward factionalism. In the case of the current psychoanalytic scene, we see this trend most clearly with