Charles Brenner

Dr. Boesky and I are long-time friends. With his usual generosity and kindness toward me he has gone to the trouble of replying at length to my response to his discussion of my paper. His doing so gives me the opportunity of adding the following remarks. In the interest of time, space, and my readers' patience I shall keep them brief. First, and most important, Dr. Boesky has made me aware of a fault in my paper which I shall try to remedy.

The term psychic structure is ambiguous in a discussion of this sort. Sometimes it is used to mean one or more of the familiar concepts of the structural theory: ego, id, and superego. At other times it is used to mean any pattern of mental functioning that is of major and lasting importance. What I have until now failed to make sufficiently clear is that I am not at all suggesting that the idea of psychic structure in the second sense be given up. I fully agree with Dr. Boesky that the data we have about mental functioning speak overwhelmingly in support of the idea of continuity or consistency both in mental development and in mental functioning at any given time; that is, to use Dr. Boesky's terms, both longitudinally and in cross section. What I am suggesting is that we give up only the idea that mental functioning is best understood as consisting of the action and mutual interaction of the three agencies or structures that Freud posited: ego, id, and superego. I suggest that our theory will fit better with available psychoanalytic data and will serve us better in our understanding of mental functioning, both clinically and otherwise, if we think of each individual's mental functioning as structured or patterned by conflicts and compromise formations that have their origins in early childhood and that persist throughout life.

I hope this explanation clarifies and disposes of what Dr. Boesky saw as the most important point of disagreement between us, namely, his impression that I propose to dispense altogether with the idea of p