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In his characteristically lucid and forceful style, Brenner here discusses the reasons why he believes that psychoanalysis should be considered one of the natural sciences. I agree with him that psychoanalysis should be considered a science. However, there are many who disagree. Rorty (2000) said the following:
As I read [William James and John Dewey], their central contribution is their criticism of the idea that knowledge and truth are to be understood in terms of conformity with, or accurate representation of, the way things really are. I read this criticism as a move towards substituting the imagination, considered as the ability to find new and more profitable descriptions of ourselves and our environment, for reason, considered as a truth-tracking faculty that gradually shapes our minds to the contours of the really real [p. 819; emphasis added].
For a penetrating discussion of the flaws in such arguments, see Hanly and Hanly, (2001). In fact, Rorty dismisses the question of viewing psychoanalysis as a science. He states: “As far as I can see, the main use which pragmatist philosophy might have for psychoanalysts is to help them stop asking (obsessive?) questions like ‘Is psychoanalysis a science?’” (p. 822).
In this essay Brenner states, and I agree, that scientific validity never involves a complete proof. No scientific hypothesis can be