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It easy to start with the first assertion that is put forth; each competing theory should be judged solely on its merits, not on the basis of authority. Here I completely agree, psychoanalysis was burdened by a type of idealization of Freud (or at least each author's version of Freud) for the first fifty to sixty years of its history. This idealization led authors to use phrases that stipulate that Freud has demonstrated a point when it would be more accurate to say that Freud has mentioned an issue or put forth a hypothesis. At a time when psychoanalysis was heavily weighed down by authoritarian pronouncements, Brenner and Arlow both sought to move the field away from using a Freud reference as the ultimate source of enlightenment. Alternatively, at present there is a type of Freud bashing that is construed as constituting a theoretical statement. It is as if some authors assume that a disagreement with Freud is the equivalent of a new theoretical statement or concept.
Other authors have more subtly used their authority to state a theoretical position. Gill (1976) and Mitchell (1998) have declared (rather than demonstrated) that psychoanalysis cannot be a branch of natural science. Their argument that thoughts are not material entities is not an argument, but simply the way they have chosen to define thought processes and mental entities. It is also indicative of the type of theory they have chosen to promulgate. If they stated that there is no theoretical value in linking psychoanalysis to the