Discussion of Charles Brenner: Reflections on Psychoanalysis

How embarrassing for psychoanalysis that Charles Brenner has to begin his concise and orderly exposition by reminding us that psychoanalytic theories should be judged on their merits, rather than on the basis of loyalty to the persons who proposed them. Unhappily, however, Brenner's point is all too well taken: physicists do not generally describe themselves as Einsteinians, Bohrians, or Fermians; but psychoanalysts routinely claim with pride to be Kleinians, Lacanians, or Freudians.

Similarly, Brenner should not have to point out to us that pluralism among psychoanalytic theories is acceptable only as a transient condition. Progressive understanding in psychoanalysis, as in any other discipline, demands that adjudication among competing theories be accomplished through a process of systematic hypothesis testing, the outcome of which is often dialectical, such that some elements from each of the original disputants are retained in a single, superior integration. Consistency may sometimes be the hobgoblin of small minds, but espousing pluralism is often just a way of rationalizing sloppy thinking.

Science is, as Brenner points out, a matter of attitude; and the arguments he makes regarding psychoanalysis as a science in the strictest sense are, to my mind, indisputable. I find it ironic that the clarity and rigor of Brenner's thinking have been portrayed pejoratively as reductionistic or too coldly impersonal. In fact, by advocating methodological precision and care, Brenner encourages us to fully