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Brenner begins with a discussion of why psychoanalysis is a science. He informs us that the fact that it deals with the nonmaterial world does not distinguish it from other branches of science, and explains that the fact that its theories are inferences does not distinguish it from other branches of science. His assertion at this point is clear; though while not apparently controversial, he has not actually proven to my satisfaction, that psychoanalysis is a science.
Having “established” that psychoanalysis is a science, Brenner tells us that it must conform to the rules of science. These are that it follow the rules of logical discourse, not depend on magical or miraculous explanations, not contradict known facts, and employ parsimony in explaining the phenomena within its domain. His position is again clear, and again not apparently controversial, but as we shall see, this part of his argument will later be used in a way the unsuspecting reader may not, at this point, expect. That notwithstanding, an imaginary reader may be more than willing to go along with Brenner at this point in the essay.
Brenner next reminds us of the principles that psychoanalysts agree constitute a psychoanalytic perspective. This is a section on consensus. The principles include the existence of conscious and unconscious mental activity, psychic causality, and psychological development. He adds that the ideas he espouses about infantile sexuality and conflict are not accepted by all analysts, but that to him these