You do not currently have permission to view the full text for this document. Please sign in to an account with an active subscription or contact support.
Among the many references to the mechanism of projection in Jung's writings, I propose to analyse the definition that he formulated in 1921, when he suggested a distinction between two types of projective mechanisms, namely Projection and Einfühlung, or “feeling into”. I shall also refer to other aspects of his theory relating to this subject, and present some clinical material to illustrate the use of projective mechanisms.
In the definition of projection, Jung emphasises the expulsive quality of the mechanism. “Projection”, he says, “is a process of dissimilation, wherein a subjective content is estranged from the subject and … incorporated in the object. There are painful, incompatible contents of which the subject unburdens himself by projection, just as there are also positive values which for some reason are uncongenial to the subject; as for instance, the consequences of self-depreciation” (Jung, 1921).
Projection presupposes some discrimination of subject and object as it involves the perception of somebody or something other than oneself, a receptacle for the projected content which can be experienced as separate.
The stage which is prior to differentiation is described by Jung with the term “primitive identity”. The detailed analysis of this concept is to be found in studies where he compares psychic states typical of primitive man to the initial stage of development of the child in the Western cultures. He subscribes to the hypothesis at present out of favour among anthropologists, that “Ontogenesis recapitulates phylogenesis”, and thus that a state of marked non-differentiation of subject and object that can be detected in some primitive cultures coincides with the starting point of psychic development. An example of marked non-differentiation among primitives is the “Couvade”. During the woman's labour, the man perceives the pain of the contractions instead of her, and is thus intimately involved in the experience of child-