Derek Bolton and Jonathan Hill, Mind, Meaning and Mental Disorder: The Nature of Causal Explanation in Psychology and Psychiatry, Oxford and New York:  Oxford University Press, 1996,  1980 pp., hb. £49.50, pb. £24.95.

This work will appear formidable to those who have no great interest in the philosophy of science and, in particular, the philosophy of mind. Those whose professional concern is restricted to the understanding of child development and child psychotherapy and psychoanalysis may not find the subject matter greatly to their taste. But if, on the other hand, they do have an interest in this very difficult field, and find that the very apt subtitle is of some appeal, they will find themselves involved in a very thorough and painstaking account of a complex and controversial subject. But, as the authors declare at the very beginning of their introduction, there may be a very good reason, even for clinicians, to take the subject seriously:

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The starting point of this book is an assumption that theories of the mind need to provide an account of order and disorder, which have been traditionally the domain of psychology and psychiatry; and that psychology and psychiatry need to understand the nature of their explanations, which is the province of the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of science,

In a brief review, it is impossible to do more than give the barest outline of the line of thinking they pursue.

The first chapter sets out the argument that ‘explanations of behaviour in terms of meaningful mental states have theory-driven predictive power’ and concludes that ‘such explanations are causal’. To put it another way, ‘such states are causes of (intentional) behaviour’ (p. 72). This conclusion raises further questions which the authors are not afraid to tackle. But, if it is believed that the material causation of behaviour lies in the brain, then it is fair to ask how and in what way this is compatible with the argument of the first chapter. It is to this question that the second chapter is devoted. The easy ‘answer’ — the brain-mind identity theory — is rejected, as it was by the great English neurologist Hughlings Jackson long before the nineteenth century