Correspondence

Letter to the editors from Dr Lorne Loxterkamp

Devon, England

Dear Editors,

When I wrote my piece on Segal's idea of symbolic equation (this Journal Vol. 25 No. 3 1999: 498-502), I hoped to stimulate a debate on a topic that has suffered from frequent, sterile repetitions. I have always doubted the validity of symbolic equation (hereafter SE); and it was Segal's completely unchanged account in these pages (Vol. 24 No. 3 1998: 349-357) that prompted me to formulate a critical assessment. In their replies, Trevor Lubbe and Bob Hinshelwood try to preserve the notion, but do not succeed. Let me deal with their main points in turn.

Lubbe misrepresents my argument in several places because he hasn't read it carefully enough. He says that I reject SE because Segal has not proven it logically. This is not so. Nowhere do I imply the indefensible idea that a coherent concept must be the conclusion of a logical deduction. What I argue is that Segal's definition of SE does not meet the ordinary standards of reason, for she does not provide clear and well-founded criteria for its application.

He suggests that I am committed to the view that symbolism is reducible to metaphor. But I say nothing of the kind. Rather I make a rough distinction between symbol and metaphor on the basis that the latter always involves resemblance and the former not (always) and go on to suggest that the symbols that are psychoanalytically interesting are those that result from the metaphorical process.

He says that I treat Segal's ‘elementary example’ about violin playing and masturbation as illustrating an inhibition, in which the refusal to play the violin is explained by shameful masturbation wishes. I do not. In fact it is Segal who strongly hints at such an explanation: ‘Prior to his schizophrenic breakdown, the violin had been functioning as a symbol and used for purposes of sublimation. It had only become concretely equated to the penis at the the time of his illness’ (1957: 168). But