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For some time, Bion’s unique version of a theory of representation appears to have been overlooked. A close reading of his ideas, however, provides crucial insight into the existence of a concomitant relationship between recognition and representation. To elucidate this notion, I explore the problem of representation and recognition in autistic states, with the use of two clinical cases of child psychotherapy. In both examples, the child’s struggle to coordinate sensorial information was hampering their ability to create a sensorial engram, which if successfully formed would enable a matrix bearing the unique shape of the object to remain, in times of its absence. The process of object recognition is possible when the external object reappears before this matrix and there is a good enough resemblance between them. In contrast, if the child has difficulty coordinating perceptual information and the object fails to assist in this task, an amorphous engram is established in the psyche, to which any entity in external reality can fit. In this way, every inanimate object can become a substitute for a memorable alive object. As a result, a child cannot recognise their significant other and may remain in an undifferentiated state of merger and non-existence.