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This paper is intended to draw the attention of analytical pyschologists to some problems in the definition of individuation which have gradually become apparent in the literature. An attempt is made to set them out rather than draw firm conclusions.
In more recent years further understanding of the origins of the ego in childhood has illuminated the issues. The relation of the ego to the self in infancy and childhood is deceptively like that described by Jung in the individuation process. It has, however, been pointed out (Fordham, 1957a) that the phenomena are open to another interpretation: that the relation of the ego to the self is the reverse in infancy to that described in individuation. The implication of this thesis has not yet been adequately discussed and it is with the aim of contributing to the discussion that this paper relates the newer understanding of childhood to the more mature psychic states which Jung first postulated and then described as individuation.
The subject will be approached by considering first what is here termed the classical concept of individuation, and then making some observations on the tendency to extend it so as to cover either the whole of the life span of the individual, or simply the non-ego integrative action of the self.
The classical concept of individuation has played a significant part in the history of dynamic psychology in that it provided a basis for a psychology of maturity at a time when psycho-analytic investigation was emphasizing the infantile components of the psyche. Conceived as a sophisticated development, the concept opened the way to the analysis of older people and defined a psychology distinct from that of childhood. For the last four decades analytical psychologists have been virtually alone in pioneering this field, thanks to Jung's outstanding contribution.