II. A Comment on James Hillman's Papers

There will be agreement with much of what Hillman says in his paper. That analysis is the central feature of training, that candidates must take cases under supervision, and that Jung's works should be closely studied can all be considered as of the first importance. Likewise, the value of group life is well

recognized and is being made the subject of searching inquiry in many quarters. I should, however, be giving a false impression if, in saying this, I did not add that I think that some of the agreement will be based on inadequate grounds. All points of agreement, with the exception of reading Jung's works, need to be kept under constant review, and the basic assumptions clarified and if necessary revised in the light of experience based on experiments. Hillman states, almost apologetically, that the Institute's work is experimental, inferring that this is owing to the lack of adequate tradition. For my part, I think it will be a sad day if tradition ever replaces experiment combined with reflection on the ideas which have made experiments possible.

There is one other general criticism which I should like to make. In my view, the training problems raised by Hillman are overweighted on the side of impressive activities. They seem to leave the trainee out of account far too much, especially with regard to an aspect of training which is opened up if we ask the question: How can a training organization provide conditions under which the candidate will arrive at a good assessment of his own capacity to analyse others? This question, to my mind, is central if the concept of the self is going to percolate all spheres of training and ensure that the analysis is thorough. I am unable to see that the Zürich practice of multiplying lectures and holding examinations helps in this respect—particularly examinations, since the judgement does not lie in the candidate's hands. In other words, I believe that training institutes might well make it their aim to guide the candidate's