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IN 1927 JUNG WROTE: ‘… unlived life is a destructive and irresistible force working quietly but relentlessly …’ (JACOBI 2, p. 107). From this fragment one might infer that Jung was phrasing the superordinate construct which latter day existential psychologists call ‘ontological guilt’. Thus, Maddi states that in the course of human living the choice of the past is attractive because the base is known, comfortable, relaxing; however, living in the past ineluctably involves sacrifice of the process of growth/development and brings with it the ‘guilt of missed opportunity … existentialists speak of this guilt … as ontological’ (MADDI 4, p. 138).
Maddi goes on to state that there is a polar opposite to ‘ontological guilt’ which is known as ‘existential anxiety’. This latter concept (which entails choice of the future) subsumes challenge and ‘growth possibilities’. But because the future is ‘uncharted’, the choice of the future is imbued with ‘anxiety’, according to Maddi.
Elsewhere in his book Maddi points out the similarities between the ‘ontological guilt/existential anxiety conflict’ on the one hand and Otto Rank's ‘life fear/death fear’ conflict on the other. However, one major differentia between the existentialist position and the Rankian stance is how the conflict should be resolved. Rank believed—in Maddi's words—that ‘… the person is caught between two poles of a conflict that is as basic as being alive … the only way to achieve a workable existence is to strike a compromise … a compromise which minimises both fears’. However, the existentialists advocate—again in Maddi's words—‘… choice of the future … to accept existential anxiety as an unfortunate concomitant of authentic being’ (Ibid., p. 138).