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Various comparisons have been drawn between Jung and Freud on specific topics, e.g., dream dynamics, personality typologies and motivational constructs. The focus here is on their fundamentally different assumptions regarding two important aspects of human nature. One deals with the relationship between mind and body. The other concerns the nature of the subjectivity of human consciousness. The differing assumptions of the two men emerge after comparing them on two types of reductionism.
Joseph Rychlak (31) has devised a useful way of categorising personality theorists according to the philosophical viewpoints and assumptions they hold. It entails classifying theorists as Lockean, Kantian, or mixed as regards their views on mind and behaviour. One important difference between these frameworks concerns views on reductionism. John Locke espoused a reductionistic model (LOCKE 26). Complex levels of consciousness, according to him, are composed of and can be reduced to more basic, less abstract units. Thus, for example, complex concepts (such as ‘radio’) which may form in consciousness can be reduced to less abstract thoughts (such as ‘transistors’, ‘wires’ and ‘dials’). Locke's perspective may be applied to behavioural units as well, but the concentration here will be on the mind.
Opposed to this outlook is the stance taken by Immanuel Kant . For Kant, complex aspects of consciousness cannot be reduced to simpler units. In conjunction with this is the idea that meaning emanates from above, i.e., the knowledge we have about ourselves and the world is affected by the subjective meaning we place on objective reality. Using an analogy from information processing theory, this might be called a ‘top-down’ model (NORMAN, RUMELHART 28). We understand the various parts of anything in relation to how we view the whole. Within this context, Kant spoke of specific psychological structures which shape the whole by imposing the subjective frameworks of time and sp