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A Psychological Schema of the structure of the mind is like a map. It should not be confused with the real thing. A map is used for a purpose. A geological map would be useless to a motorist. A sociologist's map would be different from a psychotherapist's. Freudian and Jungian analysts need different maps because they use different methods.
I said that the map should not be confused with the real thing. What is the real thing in the case of the mind? A series of maps or representations? Yes, and much else.
How far does introspection lead us in our experience of ourself? Writing in 1910, William James distinguished between ‘I’, the self as knower and doer, and ‘me’, or myself as known or experienced. He saw no value in studying the ‘I’ as knower and felt it should be banished to the realm of philosophy—whence it has been rescued and reinstated by the phenomenologists. Concerning the ‘myself’ as known, James included a material self which contained one's body, one's family, and one's possessions; then a social self, which was a reflection of the way other people see the individual; and finally a spiritual self, including emotions and desires (JAMES 17).
All these aspects of the self have stood the test of time and have been studied in detail. Furthermore, James recognised that all the aspects were capable of evoking feelings of heightened or lowered self-esteem. And finally, James described the self as carrying a feeling of basic unity and continuity, even while being highly differentiated.
Cooley defined ‘self’ as that which is designated in common speech by the pronouns of the first person singular, I, me, mine, myself. The self is characterised by stronger emotions than is the non-self. Cooley introduced the concept of the ‘looking-glass self’—the concept of the individual perceiving himself in the way others see him (COOLEY 2).
Taking this idea further, George Mead argued that the self-concept in fact arises out of the