Correspondence

2 September 1996

Tresan (JAP ) claims to review the relationship of depth psychology to modern brain research. He believes that ‘a body of clinical theory that is in frank variance with how the brain works probably will not survive as a mainstream treatment modality’ (p. 399). This sentence is either a tautology or based on unexplained propositions. If a body of clinical theory ‘works’ (and this should be one condition to become a mainstream treatment modality) it cannot be reasonably thought to be at frank variance with how the brain works. This would be the tautological version. If the sentence is not a tautology, the question arises how we can assess what actually is a ‘frank variance’. In order to answer this question some knowledge about the relations between brain and mind needs to be available. But according to Tresan (p. 413) ‘how mind relates to the inanimate matter of brain is still an open question.’ The term ‘frank variance’ thus cannot have any meaning.

Tresan quotes Kim's definition: ‘The doctrine of emergence, in brief, is the claim that when basic physicochemical processes achieve a certain level of complexity of an appropriate kind, genuine novel characteristics, such as mentality, appear as “emergent” qualities’ (p. 404). He concludes: ‘Emergence sounds very much like Jung's synthetic method of analysis’ (p. 407). He reaches this conclusion from applying the definition in an analogical manner—without discussing this application. Tresan writes as if he is very clear about the—unknown—relation between mind and brain. I will give just one example: ‘Analysis, like all learning, depends on the plasticity of the brain, and it is clear that neurons can be altered at dendritic and synaptic levels over an entire lifetime. We know, though, that the degree of plasticity is limited and that it is no small matter to bring about large and lasting changes. Every analyst is aware of this’ (p. 415). This statement does not make sense. It is