Reply to Maloney

Let me first thank Alan Maloney for his spirited and thought provoking comments on my original paper. We do, nevertheless, continue to disagree, and I must, therefore, take issue with several of Maloney's assertions in this final response.

Beginning with evolutionary psychology, Maloney states that ‘the logic of evolution’ leads to the conclusion that ‘all mental ability is based on modularity’. If this is indeed his position, it represents a fundamental misunderstanding of evolution, let alone evolutionary psychology. Just as the logic of evolution does not predict that a photosensitive cell in a primitive organism will become a mammalian eye millions of years later, neither does it predict that the fundamental organization of mind will be modular. Evolutionary theory does predict differential patterns of parental investment in offspring, but it does not predict how that outcome will be achieved (Dawkins 1976). I have not disputed this sort of evolutionary argument, although others might. The proposition that the fundamental structure of the mind consists of domain specific, complex computational modules that ‘generate’ outcomes, and that it is ‘absurd’ to think otherwise (Cosmides & Tooby as quoted by Maloney in his first response , p. 104), does not derive from evolutionary theory but from cognitive science. The cognitive argument is that in order to ‘generate’ complex behaviour, such as syntax - and, by extension to the present discussion, archetypal content - one must have a sophisticated computational system implemented in the organism's brain. This argument originates in Alan Turing's theory of computability and in Chomsky's critique of behaviourism. It has nothing inherently to do with evolutionary theory, as Chomsky himself makes clear in his resolute refusal to speculate on the evolutionary origins of his ‘language acquisition device’.

However, while evolutionary theory does not necessarily lead one to a modular theory of mind, it can present serious problem