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Who is afraid of Carl Gustav Jung? Ostensibly, those in the ‘hard’ sciences engaging ‘objectively’ in the study of neurophysiology and the cognitive capacity of the brain in order to understand and explain emotional reality. The author criticizes the sciences for neglecting and ignoring C. G. Jung's complex doctrine out of fear of his emphasis on the subjective and irrational. For this reason, Cope says, Jung's ideas have been marginalized by the scientific community. It is, perhaps, important to note at this point that the author is not a Jungian analyst and writes primarily from the perspective of the theory of science.
The title Fear of Jung is, on a deeper level, chosen wisely by the author as the book deals, fundamentally, with the mind-body problem, not in a monistic or dualistic sense, but as a confluence of body and psyche—the ‘embodied intellective human psyche’ (p. 8). This approach, I think, challenges both the traditional ‘order systems’, namely the scientific dualism and the Jungian monism, and specifically the notion that they are mutually excluding perspectives. Both scientific dualists and Jungian monists might, therefore, be shaken up a little by this book and so have something to ‘fear’.
In order to make Cope's epistemological contribution to emotional science clear, it will be necessary for me to outline the theoretical terms of reference in which he has