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Erik Goodwyn's paper, ‘Approaching archetypes: reconsidering innateness’, presents a perplexing set of problems in formulating a response. In 2001 I had the privilege of joining Anthony Stevens for a debate concerning the nature of innate versus emergent theories of archetypes in a plenary session of the IAAP's International Congress in Cambridge. Rather than attempt a direct transcript of the debate, both Stevens and I were invited to prepare brief responses to questions submitted by the moderator of the debate, Denise Ramos. These comments were included in the proceedings of the Congress (Stevens, Hogenson & Ramos 2003). In the same year I published a paper in this Journal outlining some aspects of the theory of evolution that I believed shaped Jung's own thinking on the subject, and that significantly challenged what I termed the strong innatist position in Jung (Hogenson 2001). In this paper I paid considerable attention to the work of the anthropologist and neuroscientist, Terrence Deacon, whose book, The Symbolic Species, dealt in great detail with the evolution of language and the neurological structures underlying the learning and production of language (Deacon 1997). Following publication of this paper, I engaged in a stimulating and vigorous exchange regarding evolutionary psychology and innateness in Jung with Alan Maloney, again in the pages of this Journal (Maloney & Hogenson 2003a, 2003b). In these exchanges, some now nearly a decade old, I believe I made my position on innatism in Jung as clear as possible, and I have continued to elaborate on the problem of innate archetypes since then, as well as developing what I believe is a fairly clear argument about the nature of emergence as an alternative to strong innatism. In his paper, however, Goodwyn addresses none of this material. These lacunae in Goodwyn's review of the problem of innatism in Jungian scholarship therefore demand yet another remedial overview of what my arguments actually consist in, a