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An oft-repeated and largely unexamined assumption in Jungian psychoanalysis is the notion of “analyzability”, that is, of an individual's ability or present capacity to think symbolically. It is often taught that if someone is unable to think symbolically, a depth analysis is not possible. Such an individual may be more aptly suited for supportive psychotherapy, the argument goes, an experience that may very well lead to the development of the ego's capacity for symbolic thought but is not, in and of itself, a Jungian analysis. While this sort of categorical thinking has, at times, crossed over into ontological claims about individuals and groups, the notion of analyzability encountered in psychoanalytic theory and praxis is often cloaked in facially neutral language. The impact, however, has been anything but neutral in effect. In this paper, I propose a softening of our theoretical edges through a genealogy of the category of analyzability within the broader history of psychoanalysis. Through this excavation, I explore the contingent nature of the category of analyzability, how it has constricted knowledge, perpetuated inequality, and, more broadly, obscured ways of knowing. In so doing, I recover the radically democratic potential that lies at the heart of Jungian psychoanalysis.