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Are Freudian slips in trouble? The answer is yes to Daniel Goleman (1984) who reviewed a few of the recent psychological studies and interviewed several writers in this field. Goleman says: “Freud read hidden meanings in every slip. But the new school of thought holds that the vast majority of slips are devoid of ulterior motives or meanings; though some may, indeed, be motivated by unconscious conflicts, more often than not, a slip is just a slip” (p. C1).
On the other hand, Charles Brenner takes a more optimistic view. According to Brenner, the trouble with this new school of thought is that its proponents do not use the psychoanalytical method to test Freud's hypothesis. If they did, “A hidden determinant would be found even for the most seemingly innocuous slips” (Brenner, in Goleman, 1984).
This is neither a new controversy nor a new problem for Freud. The findings of cognitive psychologists can hardly change or redefine the status of Freud's theory of parapraxes. The issue has more to do with the logic of scientific inquiry than with the “real meaning” of a forgotten lunch engagement. Freud's contribution lies in his application of scientific principles to the behavioral and psychic domain. His theories of slips and errors are primarily treatises in the epistemology of science. Freud's fundamental message in such works is that “nothing in the mind is arbitrary or undetermined” (Freud, 1901). That is, errors and slips are subject to the operation of well-established psychological biases and dispositions rather than random in origin. For instance, Freud (1901) postulates that the human mind is incapable of generating