On Cause, Teleology and the Question of Drive Versus Wish: A Comment on Nigel Mackay's Refutation of Purposive Explanations*

While praising Nigel Mackay's scholarly paper, I have taken issue with some of his conclusions. I have argued that his rejection of purposive explanations is based on a confusion between the teleological language and teleological system. I have expressed much doubt about the adequacy of his reductionistic proposal of dispensing with wishes, intentions, beliefs and meanings in favor of the physical state of the organism. I have contended that as psychoanalysts we are not interested in explaining the movements of the body. We are rather interested in understanding their meanings in the psychoanalytic situation. And from knowing the physical states of the organism associated with movements of the body, we cannot decipher their meanings. I have also argued that reductions in terms of ad hoc definitions are simply tautological exercises that might render different ways of describing a process or an event. A recast of a clinical phenomenon in terms of drives rather than wish or belief, is neither a lawful reduction nor an “unpacking.” It is simply a re-packing, merely changing the language of a particular narrative.