Chapter 16 Scientific Knowledge

One of the most remarkable characteristics of contemporary psychoanalysis is the in-depth reflection on the knowledge of science, its nature, functions and criteria. This approach differs from that of philosophy, which has its own language and concepts.1 Such reflection aims to provide food for thought for those for whom the problems of contemporary epistemology are important. The two types of thinking which share the same field as psychoanalysis are the biological and anthropological models.

Neurobiology is striving to supplant psychoanalysis and to discredit it by declaring it to be unscientific, thus not very credible. In fact, its pretensions are already outmoded, epistemological reflection having pointed up their limits. Research into man is currently dominated by the neurobiological interpretation of consciousness. The unconscious of psychoanalysts is as a rule beyond the reach of neurobiologists. Within this general context, specific studies have been carried out into various subjects: dreams, memory, the emotions, and affect, among others. These are included in the surrounding theoretical constructions: Edelman's theory of the selection of neuronal groups; Henry Atlan's selforganization; the concept of the fluctuating central state (Panksepp); epigenesis and diverse versions of the body/mind problem.

In none of these groups does the progress of neurobiology call for a dramatic revision on the part of psychoanalysis. A few details may need straightening out. If we look into the matter more closely, it is rather the neurobiologists who find that they are obliged to take into consideration the criticisms that are addressed to them (by others than psychoanalysts) or that they address to each other. The recent creation of the review Neuro-Psychoanalysis now constitutes a forum for debating these questions.2 But one swallow does not make a summer,

and as long as scientists refuse to emerge from their objectivist fort